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Abstract of Thesis
Behavioral Economics and the Effects of Psychology on the Stock Market

The purpose of this thesis is to study the contributions behavioral economics and
finance have had on the understanding on how the stock market works. The idea that
psychology plays a role in influencing the stock market can be dated back to Adam Smith
who wrote about individual’s behavior in his work Theory of Moral Sentiments. It wasn’t
until the latter half of the 20th century that behavioral economics became accepted as a
counter to Eugene Fama’s widely accepted theory of Efficient Market Hypothesis. This
paper will analyze the development of behavioral economics, review the main contributors
to the field and review main theories as it relates to the psychology of the human mind,
and how it can influence the stock market.
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Chapter One:
Introduction:
This paper tries to answer the question:
What can behavioral economics and finance teach us about decision making and
the stock market?
Behavioral Economics explores the irrationality of humans when it relates to
decision making. Classical economics will tell you that people are intrinsically rational,
looking to maximize their utility, and that they make decisions that are best for oneself.
Behaviorists conclude that people often times work irrationally, whether on purpose or
not. Humans tend to let emotions and heuristics or rules of thumb dictate their decisions.
“Behavorialists” also argue against the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) made
famous by Eugene Fama in the 1970s. EMH which will be discussed further in Chapter
Three argues that markets are practically efficient, because information is quickly
absorbed into stock prices, which creates little chance for large profits from arbitrage.
Behavorialists argue that this is not the case, that prices constantly fluctuate due to
psychological triggers and factors that the EMH cannot account for. They believe there
are limits to arbitrage create a market full of irrational investors who create a long-term
effect on equity prices.

1

Andrei Shleifer explains:
Behavioral finance has emerged as an alternative view of financial markets.
In this view, economic theory does not lead us to expect financial markets
to be efficient. Rather, systematic and significant deviations from efficiency
are expected to persist for long periods of time. Empirically, behavioral
finance both explains the evidence that appears anomalous from the
efficient markets perspective, and generates new predictions that have
been confirmed in data.1

The paper is broken into several chapters. Chapter two will discuss the valuation
of security prices in equity markets. Here I will briefly discuss how technical analysis is
used by looking for trends and patterns in stock prices in order to maximize profits. I’ll
then discuss fundamental analysis of stock prices as a tool to look for stocks that are
above or below their intrinsic value. Chapter three will introduce the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH) and theory of “random-walk” in stock prices. We’ll discuss briefly the
basic theoretical and empirical foundations of EMH, as well as the different types of
“forms”, as well as some of the limitations of EMH. Chapter four will discuss the history
and main contributors to what we now know as behavioral economics and finance.
Chapter Five will focus on the fundamental ideas of behavioral economics and heuristics.
Here we will also show results of several experiments performed on my peers, and
compare them to notable studies showing how individuals often act irrational. Chapter six
will consist of my concluding remarks.

*Note: in this paper, Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Finance are used interchangeable

Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000),2.
1
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Chapter Two:
Fundamental Theories of the stock market:
Technical Analysis:
The technical analysis approach to stocks focuses solely on the market data,
rather than information about the companies. A technical analyst, or technician, “believes
the price of a stock depends on supply and demand in the marketplace and has little
relationship value”.2 A technician argues that there is far too much information relating to
a company for one to fully understand, or evaluate when trying to make a decision based
on economic inputs alone. They believe the only important information in evaluating
stocks is the volume, and price of the securities.
Technical analysis looks at various trends over a significant period of time. Trends
occur until there is a definite break in the price movements of a stock. The main tool for
technicians are stock charts, with moving averages, trendlines and other advanced
statistics. They use these charts as they believe past price patterns can be used to predict
future price movements.
The basic pattern a “chartist” looks for are uptrends and downtrends. As shown in
Figure 1, an uptrend occurs when each new peak is higher than the last peak, and a
downtrend is where the bottom is lower than the previous one. In a downtrend, the line
horizontal from the previous high peak is called the “resistance level”. If the a future stock

David N. Dreman, Psychology and the Stock Market: Investment Strategy Beyond Random Walk ( New York:
Amacom, 1977), 21.
2
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prices breaks through this resistance level, the price reinforces the uptrend, and produces
a buy signal to a technician. The opposite is true on a downtrend. Instead of a resistance
level, they look at the “support level”, or the imaginary horizontal line from the previous
low. If a price breaks through this old support level, it signals a sell.
Figure 1. Uptrends and Downtrends in Security Prices.

Uptrend

Downtrend

Trendlines are also used by technician.

There are numerous trendlines

technicians use, common moving averages are the 50 day, 100 day, and 200 moving
averages. When a stock “breaks through” these trendlines technicians believe, the
pattern is about to break and a downtrend will swing upward or vice versa.

Fundamental Analysis:
Fundamentalists examines all relevant information affecting the price of a stock to
determine the intrinsic, or real worth of a security. Intrinsic value is what fundamentalists

4

feel a stock is truly worth based on the law of supply and demand. 3 To a fundamentalist
one can find the intrinsic value of the stock by carefully examining the company’s financial
reports, balance sheet, research & development plans, sales history, earnings, dividends,
similar companies in their industry, and economic conditions. They look for undervalued
stocks, as they feel the market can be wrong when assessing the value of a company.
The main difference between technicians and fundamentalists is that technicians
ignore economic and company related information when selecting stocks. They feel this
information is already reflected in the security price, and “value is not intrinsic but what
the market says it is by its current price”4

John J. Murphy, Technical Analysis of the Financial Markets: A Comprehensive Guide to Trading Methods and
Applications (New York, New York Institute of Finance, 1999), 5.
4 Dreman, Psychology of the Stock Market, 33.
3
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Chapter Three: The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH):
The efficient… market theory hypothesizes that all available
information is continually analyzed and reanalyzed by literally
millions of investors. It holds that in this kind of market, news of say,
an earnings increase, is quickly and accurately assessed by the
combined actions of investors and immediately reflected in the price
of the stock. …whether you buy the stock before, during, or after
the earnings news, or whether you buy another stock, you can
expect a fair rate of return commensurate with the risk of owning
whatever security you buy.5

Efficient Market Hypothesis
In the early 20th century the central belief was that markets were irrational driven
by Herds. John Maynard Keynes believed that the “stock market was mostly a beauty
contest in which judges picked who they thought other judges would pick, rather than who
they considered to be most beautiful”6. By the mid-1970s there was more evidence that
there was true randomness in earnings, and researchers were looking for a new
hypothesis to build on the random walk theory. Random-walk suggests that all price
changes are unrelated to previous prices of that stock price, or take a random-walk. The
logic behind it is that “the flow of information is unimpeded and information is immediately
reflected in stock prices, then tomorrow’s price change will reflect only tomorrow’s news
and will be independent of prices changes today.7

Ibid., 36.
Andrea Devenow and Ivo Welch, “Rational Herding in Financial Economics,” European Economic Review
40, (1996): 605.
7 Burton G. Malkiel, “The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17,
no. 1 (Winter 2003): 59.
5
6
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The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is related to the “random walk” theory that
dominates much of economics, The EMH was coined by Eugen Fama, a University of
Chicago economist. The foundation of EMH is “the rational expectations hypothesis,
enunciated first by Muth. Muth believed expectations are the same as economic theory
predictions. If all market participants have access to the same information set, then the
rational expectations assumption requires that they all agree on the distribution of market
returns. Thus, the EMH effectively rules out differences in expected returns that result
from differences in ability to process information.”8 In short, the EMH implies that market
prices will fully reflect all information available to investors, and therefore investors cannot
use arbitrage strategies to beat the market in the long-run.
At its core, the EMH maintains that it is difficult to make a lot of money through a
buy-low, sell-high strategy as markets adjust quickly to new information. The idea is that
the “smart money”, or smartest investors would be looking for opportunities to make large
profits by looking for under or over-priced assets. If the smart money found ways to make
profits through this strategy, the net effect would be to drive security prices to their true
values.9 Therefore, while some money can be made, it’s difficult to become rich off this
strategy. Shiller argues that the EMH implies intelligence and effort play no role in
investing10. The common saying is that a monkey throwing darts at a dart board has a
good a shot picking winning stocks as does an average investor looking for under-valued
securities. Finally, the EMH shows professional investors, institutional money managers,

J.F. Muth, “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements,” Econometrica 29, no 3 (1961): 319.
Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance: Revised and Expanded Third Edition (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2015), 196.
10 Ibid., 197.
8
9
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or securities analysts do not seem to have any reliable ability to outperform the market as
a whole…once account is taken of transactions cost and management fee”11

Theoretical Background
As this hypothesis states that a security price always fully reflects all available
information, there is no way for an average investor to consistently beat the market, and
efforts used by these investors by analyzing, picking and trading securities are wasted.12
The efficient market hypothesis assumes that all investors are rational, and therefore
rational in their approach to investing. However, in the event that some investors act
irrationally, stock prices will not be affected as their trades will be canceled out due to
their randomness.13 Finally, in the event that investors are irrational in similar ways, their
influence on prices will be corrected by rational arbitrageurs.14
The key concepts in these assumptions are rational investors and arbitrageurs. As
Shleifer notes:
When investors are rational, they value each security for its
fundamental value: the net present value (NPV) of its future cash
flows, discounted using their risk characteristics. When investors
learn something about fundaments values of securities, they
quickly respond to the new information by bidding up prices when
the news is good, and bidding them down when the news is bad.
As a consequence, security prices incorporate all the available
information almost immediately and prices adjust to the new levels
corresponding to the new net present values of cash flows.15

Ibid., 198
Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 1.
13 Emma Lindhe, “Herd Behavior in Stock Markets: A Nordic Study”, (Master’s Thesis, Lunds University,
2012), 7.
14 Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, 2.
15 Ibid., 2.
11
12
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Sharpe and Alexander define “arbitrage as the simultaneous purchase and sale of
the same, or essentially similar security in two different markets at advantageously
different prices”.16 For example, if you owned a stock that became overvalued in relation
to its fundamental value due to irrational investors, the security you won now becomes a
“bad buy” since the price exceeds in NPV. Observing this mispricing, arbitrageurs would
sell this stock, or possibly short it for a seemingly similar security. Arbitrageurs can make
a profit by selling it, or shorting their overpriced security, and then purchasing the
undervalued similar security.

Under EMH “arbitrage is quick and effective enough

because substitute securities are readily available and the arbitrageurs are competing
with each other to earn profits, the price of a security can never get far away from its
fundamental value, and indeed arbitrageurs themselves are unable to each much of an
abnormal return”.17 While arbitrageurs returns maybe small due to how rapidly the market
adjusts, irrational investors are buying overpriced securities, while selling underpriced
substitute securities. Famous Chicagoan economist Milton Friedman points out that this
is causing them to earn lower returns than passive and irrational investors, as they cannot
lose money forever: they must become much less wealthy and eventually disappear from
the market. If arbitrage does not eliminate their influence on asset prices instantaneously,
market forces eliminate their wealth.

William F. Sharpe and Gordon J. Alexander, Investments: Fourth Edition (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1990), n.p.
17 Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, 4.
16
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Empirical Foundations of EMH
According to Shleifer, the empirical predictions of the EMH can be divided into two
broad categories.

First, when news about the value of a security hits the market, its
price should react and incorporate this new both quickly, and
correctly. The ‘quickly’ part means that those who receive the news
later – for instance by reading it in the newspapers or in company
reports – should not be able to profit from this information. The
‘correctly’ part means that the price adjustment in response to the
news should be accurate on average: the prices should neither
underreact nor overeat to particular news announcements.18

Secondly, the price of the stock should represent the fundamental value of the
security, meaning that prices of stocks should not change if there is no news regarding
the fundamental value of the stock. Therefore, the prices should not fluctuate based on
changes of supply and demand alone.19

Three Forms of EMH
To distinguish different types of stale information, Fama gave rise to three forms
of the EMH. There are three forms of market efficiency; weak, semi-strong, and strong.
I.

Weak Form: All past price and volatility information is incorporated
in the current price of the stock. This states that any attempt to study
past prices for misprices stocks is futile, meaning there is no
discernable pattern and past prices will not give any further

18
19

Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, 5.
Ibid.
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information to future pricing. This would negate any use of technical
analysis. In essence “it is impossible to earn superior risk-adjusted
profits based on the knowledge of past prices and returns”20
II.

Semi-Strong: Includes all the characteristics of weak form, in addition
it includes all public information. This can include earnings,
management changes, innovations and investments in R&D, and
other company information.

All of which is almost immediately

reflected in the company’s stock price. Under this scenario, going
through a company’s financial records to look for misprices securities
would be in vain, as the price would already reflect this information.
Therefore, fundamental analysis would not allow for any arbitrage
and would be a waste of resources.
III.

Strong Form: Includes all details of the weak, and semi-strong
conditions, but also includes non-public information being quickly
reflected into the company’s stock price. In the strong form, even
insiders could not benefit from arbitrage as the price would be reflect
this information almost immediately as it would be leaked to the
public. Not to mention, that using private knowledge to use for
personal trading could be deemed illegal, such as having prior
knowledge of a merger/acquisition taking place before it’s made
public.

20

Ibid., 6.
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Limitations of EMH:
There are several limitations to the EMH which will me mentioned here, and further
discussed in this work. First, it is difficult to believe that people are fully rational all the
time. The late American economist Fischer Black found that investors tended to trade on
“noise” instead of information. They follow the advice of friends, TV financial experts,
investors trade too often, they don’t diversity, and tend to sell winners too soon and hold
losing stocks for too long. They are also loss averse, looking at the total levels on gains
and losses, and not associating it to a reference point. All of these points will be discussed
in Chapter Five.
Investors also tend to become irrational due to bounded rationality. Bounded
rationality is a concept where decision makers become irrational due to having limited or
unreliable information to answer a complex scenario with an inadequate amount of time.
In buying stocks, you often times can’t wait weeks, or days, let alone hours to purchase
a stock at the optimal time in order to create arbitrage.
Speculative bubbles also limit the validation of the EMH. If prices are
instantaneously reflected with all information, we should not see stock market bubbles.
Bubbles show that the market is often driven by the emotions of buyers and sellers, or as
Alan Greenspan called it, “irrational exuberance”.

Bubbles typically form due to

overconfidence in the market, in oneself, and when investors are buying into the current
fads. These bubbles are often created by herd mentality, later discussed in this work.

12

Chapter Four: Animal Spirits and Irrational Behavior: Keynes to
the Present.
Keynes view on efficient markets:
The belief that markets are not entirely efficient can go back prior to Fama’s EMH
theory, to the early 1900s. Famed economist, John Maynard Keynes believed that the
markets were not completely efficient. In his masterpiece, The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes believed “the element of real knowledge in the
valuation of investments by those who own them or contemplate purchasing them has
seriously declined” as stocks become widely dispersed.21 In the early twentieth-century
stocks were mainly held by mangers and family. As stocks began to be sold to the general
public and away from the internal affairs of the business, it was harder to know the true
valuation of the stock.22
Keynes did not believe that that the market could be predicted long-term due to
uncertainty in the market environment. In General theory of employment… Keynes
compared investing in stocks to a “beauty contest”, where “competitors have to pick out
the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the
competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the
competitors as a whole”.23 The competitor not only has to decide which faces they find
prettiest, but decided what the other competitors will deem the prettiest. However, all

John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (Lexington: Stellar Classics,
2016), 66.
22 Richard H. Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 2015), 209.
23 Keynes, The General Theory, 67.
21
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other competitors are having this same struggle. This is counterintuitive to how one
normally sets out to win. We are forgoing our knowledge of what we know, in order to try
and decide not only what others know and feel, but how they are going to play the
competition, or engaging in “a battle of wits”.
Keynes also argued against the theory that professional investors would keep
markets efficient, especially in the long-run. Keynes argued that many professional
speculators would lead to greater mispricing in the market, instead of bringing prices back
to their fundamental value as professionals tend to “concentrate on foreseeing changes
in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public”.24
“[Professionals] are concerned, not with what an investment is really worth to a man who
buys it ‘for keeps’, but with what the market will value it at, under the influence of mass
psychology, three months or a year hence.”25 While it can be understood that the
everyday investor can act irrationally on emotions, so to can professional investors.
Professional investors face pressures to match and surpass the yield of their competitors,
so purchasing stocks that are no longer in demand can cause them to fall behind to their
foes.
Finally, Keynes argued that psychology of the human mind caused unforeseen
volatility and fluctuations in the stock market. He said the “animal spirits” or the
“spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction” affect behavior.26 It’s these “animal
spirits” that heavily influence the equities markets. Keynes argued that even in a time of

John Cassicy, How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities (New York: Picador, 2009), 170.
Keynes, The General Theory, 66.
26 Ibid., 175.
24
25
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stability with no turmoil it was impossible to estimate the yield of return 10 years from now
a railroad business or copper mines, let alone the an equity’s value. Investors do not
think that the current situations will change, but instead act as the current situation will
continue. Keynes noted:
A conventional valuation which is established as the outcome of the
mass psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals is liable
to change violently as he results of a sudden fluctuation of opinion
due to factors which do not really make much different to the
prospective yield… The market will be subject to waves of optimistic
and pessimistic sentiment, which are reasoning, and yet in a sense
legitimate where no solid basis exists for a reasonable calculation.27

While Keynes is not considered a “behaviorist” by today’s standards, the change
to a psychological view of the stock markets can be linked to his earlier work, as
mentioned previously. Keynes wrote:
We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions affect the
future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot depend on
strict mathematical expectation, since the bases for making such
calculations does not exist; and that it is our innate urge to activity
which makes the wheels go around, our rational selves choosing
between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we
can, but often falling back for our motive on whim or sentiment or
chance.28

27
28

Cassidy, How Markets Fail, 169.
Keynes, The General Theory, 66.
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Surge of Behavior Economics:
Behavioral finance explains why individuals do not always make the
decisions they are expected to make and why markets do not
reliably behave as they are expected to behave29
– Amar Kumar Chaudhary

Important Contributors to Behavioral Economics:
Robert Shiller
Robert Shiller is the leading economist when it comes to writing in this field. Dr.
Shiller is a Professor of Economics at Yale University and received his doctoral degree
from M.I.T. in 1972. He’s worked with the National Bureau of Economic Research, and
was a member of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Advisory Committee. He is most
known for his bestselling book, Irrational Exuberance, which has been updated to a 3rd
edition in 2015. The first two editions warned of the tech and housing bubbles, and
predicted the irrational exuberance amongst investors before the financial crisis of 20082009. To this day, he continues to write on various topics in behavioral finance.

Richard Thaler
Richard Thaler is considered one of the father figures is the school of behavioral
economics.

He is a professor at the University of Chicago, where along with a

collaboration with colleagues came the early foundations of behavioral Economics.30

Amar Kumar Chaudhary, ”Impact of Behavioral Finance in Investment Decisions and Strategies: A
Fresh Approach,” International Journal of Management Research and Business Strategy 2, no. 2 (2013): 85.
30 Munir Quddus, “Behavioral Economics: Acritical Analysis”, Proceedings of the Midwest Business
Economics Association. (2002), 143.
29
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Thaler stated “that most people actually behave like…people. They are prone to error,
irrationality and emotion, and act in ways inconsistent with maximizing their own financial
well-being.” Thaler argues that people often make decisions that don’t have their own
long-term interest in mind, and people act emotionally instead of instinctively.

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
Finally, Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos Tversky, while not necessarily
behaviorists, have been extremely influential in the psychology and decision making.
Kahneman was born in Tel Aviv, and grew up in France during World War II. He received
his Bachelor of Science degree from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Psychology,
and later received his PhD in Psychology from University of California, Berkley. Amos
was born in what is now Israel, and received his undergraduate degree from the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, and his PhD from the University of Michigan.
In the late 1970’s Kahneman and Tversky started collaborating and published a
series of articles on cognitive psychology. Some of their work will be discussed later in
this paper. They are most known for their publication on their Prospect Theory, which will
be discussed in the coming sections, but at its foundation “illustrated how investors
systematically violate the utility theory”31 They are also known for their contribution to
heuristics and biases, such as availability and representativeness. Kahneman later
received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to the study
of rationality in Economics.

Nathalie Abi Saleh Dargham, “The Implications of Behavioral Finance”. FGM, Retrieved September 13,
2016, from http://www.fgm.usj.edu.lb/pdf/a102009.pdf.
31
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Foundations of Behavioral Economics
“Behavioral finance is a relatively new field that seeks to combine behavioral and
cognitive psychological theory with conventual economic and finance to provide
explanations for why people make irrational financial decision (Figure 2)”32. Behavioral
finance studies how the psychology and sociology affect financial players and ultimately
the security market.

Dr. Rohit Kishore, of the University of Western Sydney Australia

states; “the field of ‘behavioral finance’ has evolved in order to attempt to better
understand and explain how emotions and cognitive errors influence investors and the
decision-making process”33.
Figure 2: Foundations of Behavioral Finance

Psychology

Finance

Behavioral
Finance
Sociology

Source: Amar Kumar Chaunhary. “Impact of Behavioral Finance In Investment Decisions and
Strategies: A Fresh Approach.”. International Journal of Management Research and Business
Strategy 2, no.2 , (2013), 86.

Chaudhary, ”Impact of Behavioral Finance, 86.
Rohit Kishore, “Theory of Behavioral Finance and its Applications to Property Markety: A Change in
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As introduced earlier in this work, traditional economic models and theories
assume investors act rationally all the time, and consider all available information before
making a decision, whether it comes to buying/selling stocks, or making other economic
decisions. Behavioral finance looks to show that this is far from the truth, and people tend
to be reactionary when making decisions. Munir Quddus states “people often respond to
skewed reasoning, self-indulgence, self-destructive behavior and a host of other human
frailties and strengths”.34

34

Quddus, “Behavioral Economics, 139.
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Chapter Five: Fundamentals ideas of Behavioral Economics.
Major Theories of Behavioral Economics
Prospect Theory
Tversky and Kahnheman’s most influential and lasting contribution to the field of
behavioral economics is their work on the development of Prospect Theory, in regards to
how people manage risk and uncertainty. They found that humans are not always riskaverse, rather they are risk-averse when it comes to gains, but risk-seekers when facing
loses.35 Prospect theory illustrates how people make choses between two alternatives
that involve risk, where the probabilistic outcome of each result is known.
Prospect Theory counters the classical theory of utility maximization.

Utility

maximization assumes people act rationally, and “consumes in such a way as to obtain
the most satisfaction out of the money and time spent”.36 This assumes that the consumer
knows all information available, all potential outcomes, and will act without emotion, and
select the option that gives them the most satisfaction. However, we know that people
act impulsively and have a hard time correctly accessing probabilities. Komlos states that
often times “there is not enough time to think about decisions carefully, and insufficient
time to sort out the relevant information from background noise; we also have difficulty
accessing the quality of information”.37 This is especially true when it comes to the stock
market. Your average investor does not know where to go to get the most accurate

Kishore, “Theory of Behavioral Finance”, 4.
John Komlos, What Every Economics Student Needs to Know: And Doesn’t Get in the Usual Principles Text
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 41.
37 Ibid., 42.
35
36
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information on the health of the market, and even a more difficult time sorting through all
the information regarding a particular stock. By the time your average investor consumes
all this information from cable news, the internet, the newspapers, co-workers and
financial advisors, the price of the stock could have fluctuated so much, that the decision
they make could ultimately be the wrong one.
Through experiments, Kahneman and Tversky found that how we value an item is
based on a “reference point” or value. Where utility maximization focuses more on the
total magnitude of a person’s wealth, status, or consumption. It is more difficult for humans
to determine this level, than it is to understand the changes in these variables. In essence
it is easier for us to evaluate the changes in levels, than it is to fully understand the levels
themselves. Noticing this is where they concluded that the mind looks for a reference
point when making decisions.
The reference point and better understanding of changes, rather than levels can
be seen in the below example.

Suppose Adam just logged on to his online stock

brokerage account and sees the value of his portfolio drop from $4 million, to $3 million.
At the same time, Brian checks his account and sees his net worth has increased from
$1 to 1.1 million. According to the conventual approach. Adam should be happier than
Brian because he is wealthier and has more utility, however this approach doesn’t
adequately reflect the emotional feelings of transitions from one state of wealth to another.
38

38

This can be seen in Figure 3 below. While Adam lost $1 million, or 25% of his net worth,

Ibid., 50-51.
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he would still be happier in the conventual sense as he has more utility than Brian who
gained $100,000 in wealth.
Figure 3: Utility at Various Levels of Wealth.

Source: John Komlos, What Every Economics Student Needs to Know: And
Doesn’t Get in the Usual Principles Text, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014, 52.

Kahneman and Tversky note that in the utility maximization theory depicted in
Figure 3, there is no mention of a starting point, or reference point. From this they
recreated the problem by looking at gains and losses and used that as the foundation for
their prospect theory.
Figure 4 is drawn in terms of gains and losses, instead of an absolute value of
wealth. The origin of the graph implies a neutrality of zero, where one has become
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accustomed to their current level of consumption or wealth.39

In this figure, zero does

not mean zero wealth, but acts as a reference point, or how an individual currently views
their state of wealth at time 0. Before Adam and Brian checked their stock portfolios they
were positioned at the origin, as they were accustomed to that level of net worth. After
they checked their portfolio, Adam moved to the left, to a loss of $1M, and Brian moved
up and to the right for a gain of $0.1M and is therefore happier than Adam.
Figure 4: Prospect Theory in relation to Gains and Losses.

Source: “Prospect Theory is Calibrated in Terms of Gains and Losses, Not in
Levels.” John Komlos, What Every Economics Student Needs to Know: And
Doesn’t Get in the Usual Principles Text, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014, 53.

39

Ibid., 52.
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Kahneman relabels Figure 4 by changing the Y Axis to “Psychological Value” in
Figure 5. According to Kahneman;
The graph has two distinct parts, to the right and to the left of a
neutral reference point. A salient features is that it is S-shaped,
which represents diminishing sensitivity for both gains and losses.
Finally, the tow curves of the S are not symmetrical. The slope of
the function changes abruptly at the reference point: the response
to losses is strong than the response to corresponding gains.40

Figure 5: Prospect Theory according to Kahneman.

Source: Daniel Kahneman. Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2013, 283.

40

Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 282.
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You can see that the slope of the graph is far greater, about twice what is in
quadrant III then in quadrant I. Kahneman and Tversky noticed this through many
experiments that losses decrease one’s welfare more than gains increased.41 This can
be shown by people taking on risk, in order to reduce loses, or loss aversion.

Loss Aversion

Loss aversion is a strong phenomenon of behavioral economics. Traditional
economic principles imply that people are often risk-averse, that investors will only take
on risk for an acceptable return. Loss aversion implies that investors will increase their
risk, to avoid the probability of loss because “investors suffer greater disutility from a
wealth loss than the utility from an equivalent wealth gain”.42 In a famous experiment,
Kahneman asked the following question:
You are offered a gamble on the toss of a coin.
If the coin shows tails, you lose $100.
If the coin shows heads, you win $150.
Is this gamble attractive? Would you accept it?

To answer this question, you must decide not on the monetary gain, but the
psychological gain from the end result. We know that flipping a coin results in a 50/50
result in landing heads, but is the result of gaining $150 enough to cancel out the same
risk of losing $100? Kahneman found that for most people the fear of losing $100 was
far greater than the joy they would have received from winning $150.

41
42

Komlos, What Every Economics Student, 52.
Dargham, “The Implications of Behavioral Finance”, 11.
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I asked this same question on my questionnaire to 86 colleagues and peers and
the results overwhelming prove what Kahneman discovered. Figure 6 shows that out
of 86 responses, 77, or 89.53% would not take that gamble, while only 9 or 10.47%
would.

Figure 6: Loss Aversion: Coin Toss.

Source: Justin Nagy. February, 2017.

The results show that even though the 50% gamble would result in a larger gain
than the equivalent percentage chance of loss, the $50 “premium” to take on this risk
was not enough. Kahenman asks, “what is the smallest gain that I need to balance an
equal chance to lose $100?”. Meaning, in a game of chance, where two outcomes are
26

equally likely to occur, what potential gain must be available for one to risk losing $100.
Kahenman found that people tend to answer $200 to his above question, meaning on
average one needs a 2:1 odds in order to take on a 50/50 gamble. He did find
professional investors are “more tolerant of losses, probably because they do not
respond emotionally to every fluctuation” in the stock market.43
Loss aversion plays a huge role in the way average investors buy and sell stocks.
Studies show that investors are quicker to sell a stock that has increased in value by X,
then they are to sell a stock that has decreased by value X. The idea of a loss, is more
painful, or outweighs the joy of the gains. Investors tend to hope that the fallen stock will
bounce back to a break-even point, while investors who have seen a gain are worried
about a “loss” if the stock falls back to the break-even point.

On my questionnaire, I

asked participants the following question:
You purchased 100 shares of a well-known company stock a month
ago, at $80 a share. The stock recently peaked at $95 a share, but
today has plummeted to $75 a share. You look at the Yahoo Finance
and see there is high volume of people selling their shares. You
haven't heard any news today regarding the stock, and don't know
why it's falling. What do you do?
In Figure 7, the results confirm Kahneman’s findings and shows that people are
loss averse, and rather take the risk to get back to the break-even point. *

43

Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 284.

*Note: Respondents were not given the opportunity to sell their shares at $95 a share. If this was an
option I would assume overwhelmingly respondents would have done so in order to secure gains. This
will be discussed in a later section under Disposition Effect.
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Figure 7: Loss Aversion: Stock Market.

Source: Justin Nagy. February, 2017.

Of the 86 responses, 87.21% of the participants would hold on to the shares,
because they might go back up above the purchase price. 9.3% of respondents would
buy more, and only 3.49% would sell their stock in order to take the $5 per share to avoid
future loses. What’s interesting here is that almost three times as many participants would
rather buy more stocks, then sell. Not only does this reinforce that people are loss averse,
but people would rather take the gamble that the price is going to increase to at least the
breakeven point, then to realize a loss.
Selling a losing stock is unpleasant and painful, as it gives immediate feedback
that you picked a “loser”. People tend to make a mistake in “mental accounting” by only
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looking at individual stocks, and not the stock market at their portfolio as a whole.44 Finally,
loss aversion can cause people to be reluctant to make timely decisions by focusing too
much on what they could lose, and not what they could gain in the long-run, this referred
to as the status quo bias or inertia.

Fear of Regret and Disposition Effect
Investors have a hard time admitting they were wrong when it turns out their stock
pick declined. As previously mentioned, investors tend to hold on to losers too long, and
sell winners too soon, which is known as the disposition effect. Disposition effect is the
result of mental accounting or the process of separating one’s money into separate
accounts instead of a whole. A rational investor would focus on the overall return of their
portfolio and not focus on one stock. However, Dr. Shlomo Benartzi found that “the typical
investor treats the portfolio as a series of investing episodes”.45
Tversky and Kahnmean tested this in an experiment when they asked participants
the following question: would you rather take a sure game of $500, or a 50/50 shot at
winning $1000 (or $0) after already winning $1000. They found overwhelmingly that the
participants would rather take the sure $500 instead of the gamble, cashing out gains
higher than what’s already guaranteed.

Shlomo Benartzi, “Behavioral Finance in Action: Psychological Challenges in the Financial
Advisor/Client Relationship, and Stategies to Solve Them,” Center for Behavioral Finance, accessed from
WWW.AllianzBeFi.Com on September, 28,2016, 5.
45 Ibid., 13.
44
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During my survey to my peer’s I replicated their experiment and found results
confirming their study. I asked 86 participants the following question and gave them two
responses to choose from:
In addition to whatever you own, you have been given a gift of
$1,000, free of charge. You are now asked to choose between the
following:
A) A sure gain of $500
B) A 50% chance to gain $1000 and 50% chance to gain $0.

The results (Figure 8) showed over 3 in 4 participants would rather take the sure smaller
gain instead of taking a risk to gain a larger amount, even when there would be no further
financial loss to them if they lose the game.
Figure 8: Disposition Effect and Chance.

Source: Justin Nagy. February, 2017.
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Disposition effect also shows that people hold on to loses too long. This is seen in
the same survey question asked previously:
You purchased 100 shares of a well-known company stock a month
ago at $80 a share. The stock recently peaked at $95 a share, but
today has plummeted to $75a share. You look at the Yahoo Finance
and see there is high volume of people selling their shares. You
haven't heard any news today regarding the stock, and don't know
why it's falling. What do you do?
A) Hold on to the shares
B) Buy more shares
C) Sell your shares

The results from Figure 7 were staggering, confirming Tversky and Kahneman’s studies.
Over 87% off the responders would rather hold on the “losing” stock then to sell it and
realize a small loss.
By not realizing a loss, investors do not have to deal with regret and confirming the
notion that they would have fared better making a different past decision, and instead can
remain optimistic that in the long-run their choice of stock was correct. Sherfin and
Statman found “investors ride losers to postpone regret, and sell winners’ too quickly’
because they want to hasten the felling of pride at having chosen correctly in the past”.46
One way professionals combat this is by setting up a “stop-loss” order, or a price below
the purchased price of the stock that automatically sells the stock to limit the loss. Many
professionals will set this window up at 10%-15% below the purchased price. This can

Hersh M. Shefrin and Meir Statman, “The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too
Long: Theory and Evidence,” in Advances in Behavioral Finance, ed. Richard Thaler (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1993), 511.
46
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be implemented by your average investor too help eliminate the emotional struggle of
having regret for purchasing a losing stock.
Amar Kumar Chaunhary found that investors realize greater regret when they
chose a bad stock in an unconventional way.47 As will be discussed later in this work,
investors also implement a herd mentality approach to limit regret when purchasing
stocks. In this approach, an investor picks stocks that are popular at the time, or stocks
that their friends are purchasing as it limits the research they need to make when
investing, and “reduce emotional reactions of felling since a group of individual investors
also lost money on the same bad investment”.48 Chaudhardy notes “the fear of regret
can make investors either risk averse or motivate them to take greater risk” (90)

Herd Behavior and Groupthink
Herd behavior was introduced to economics over a hundred years ago. In fact,
Thorstein Veblen argued that “consumption was governed mainly by social norms, habit,
customer and such irrational motives as status seeking, or snobbism, and by the
bandwagon effect, or herding behavior”.49 Herd behavior in the stock market is the
propensity for individuals to follow the actions of other investors in the stock market,
whether rationally or irrationally. Rational herding is based on information, where in which
rational investors will adopt the same response to other investors who share the same
stock strategies when receiving new information. Irrational herding focuses on investors
who blindly follow other investors without adequate information or accessing the risk of

Chaudhary, ”Impact of Behavioral Finance, 90.
Ibid.
49 Komlos, What Every Economics, 67.
47
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doing so.

Irrational herding is “closely linked to such distinct phenomena as imperfect

expectations, fickle changes without much new information, bubbles, fads, frenzies, and
sun-spot equilibria.50

Groupthink
Herding can occur with or without the participates knowing they are partaking in
the event, and can occur by individual investors as well as professional investors.
Professional investors and fund managers often find the disvalue of following their own
beliefs and, being incorrect (potentially leading to termination) outweighs the value of
being correct while standing alone.51 They found there tends to be a “bandwagon effect”
amongst fund managers, as performance is measured on earnings compared to the
market. If for example the competitors fund in a particular sector increased by 10% during
a particular period, while their own fund following their own fundamental analysis
increased by only 2%, they would be underperforming the competitors by 8%. When one
would rather risk being wrong when compared to their peers, instead of being right while
listening to their own instinct, and knowledge, that is known as groupthink. According to
David N. Dreman;
…the groupthink hypothesis, which states that highly cohesive
groups will often develop dangerously incorrect homogeneity in
their views. Shared illusions on the proper course of action are
reaffirmed continually by outside experts and influential investment
organizations with whom the decision maker is in constant
communication…the apparent consensus, without the heavy
buffeting of serious critical evaluation, can produce and encourage
undue optimism and promote excessive risk taking in a rising
Devenow and Welch, “Rational Herding in Financial Economics,” 30.
David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein, “Herd Behavior and Investment,” The American Economic
Review, 80, no. 3 (1990): 466.
50
51
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market…Groupthink may account for a signification portion of all
professional investment errors. It may also explain why professions
have not outperformed the markets (consistently).52
In essence, fund managers will save their reputation even if the choice they made was
an unprofitable decision, as they can “share-the-blame”. This goes back to being riskaverse, as being potentially right doesn’t offer enough premium to be wrong against the
crowd.
This idea of Groupthink has been tested in and outside of the financial markets.
One famous experiment was performed by Dr. Solomon Asch. In his experiment the
subjects where shown two cards, with different vertical lines (see figure 9). This was done
in a group setting with usually 7 or 8 participants. What the one participate didn’t know is
that all the other participants were told to deliberately give the wrong answer. The
experiment was simple, looking at the two cards, (similar to figure 9 below) which line on
the right card was the same length as the line on the left card. One can clearly see that
line A is the same length as the line in Exhibit 1, but the six participants in on the
experiment were told to say another line was the same size, for example B. In these
experiments the first six participants in on the test would say B was the same as the line
on the left. In most cases the seventh, and unknowing participant would go with the group
and agree that B was the same size as the line on the left. It was only when one or more
participants dissented from the group that the unknowing participant would follow their
gut and say line A.
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Figure 9: Groupthink: Solomon Asch Conformity Experiment.

Source: Age-of-the-Sage.org,”Solomon Asch Conformity Experiments.”
http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/psychology/social/asch_conformity.html.
Accessed: February 16, 2017.

Liquidity Trap
One Final problem with groupthink is that it can lead to a liquidity trap. The problem
occurs due to herding and groupthink as fund managers and professional investors are
buying the same stocks as other investment firms. Keynes warned of this in the 1930’s
when he said: “the fact that each individual investor flatters himself that his commitment
is ‘liquid’ calms his nerves and makes him more willing run a risk”.53 As the firms purchase
more of the same stock, they are driving up the prices, while at the same time increasing

53
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the concentration of shares. This becomes a problem, as there are less likely suiters to
purchase the stock if there is a panic. It may take time for a firm to accumulate substantial
positions in a particular security, however, when they do and there is a bit of bad news
the portfolio managers will try to sell the stocks to liquidate their positions. But because
only a small number of firms own these shares there are not enough buyers to exit these
positions, and at the same time with all these sellers they are creating serious impact to
the security price.

Individual Herding
Institutional investors are not the only ones who herd in the stock markets, in fact
with technology today, and the rush of news everywhere you look, you can see this more
so in average traders every day.

People often feel pressure to conform to their social

environment, and people who interact with each other tend to think similarly over time.54
Even more so, when people are seeing decisions made by large groups of people,
example the price of AAPL stock increasing, people tend to believe that group of people
must know something they don’t know, as they all can’t be wrong.

Information Cascade and Lemmings
Morton Deutsch and Harold Gerald, two psychologists from NYU studied human
interactions in a group setting in the 1950s. They conducted studies like the Asch test
and came to similar results. The noted:
It is not surprising that the judgement of others would be taken as
evidence to be weighed in coming to one’s own judgements…From
54
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birth on, we learn that the perceptions and judgements of others
are frequently reliable sources of evidence about reality. Hence, it
is to be expected that if the perceptions by two or more people of
the same objective situation are discrepant, each will tend to reexamine his own view and that of the others to see if they can be
reconciled.55
This observation is called information cascade. Information cascade occurs when
you disregard your own private information and received signals, and follow the actions
of others, as you perceive they must have more information that you currently have.

Lemmings Example
There is a popular saying that the average investor behaves like lemmings, or
following blinding ignoring rational analysis.56 The phrase “lemmings” comes from small
rodents found near the Arctic and Scandinavian countries. These rodents are said to
follow each other in a straight line in search of food, regardless of what is in front of them,
or act like the blind leading the blind.
Small investors tend to have less capital available for investments, so any price
change in a stock can severely impact their net worth. Because of their limited available
capital, small investors set up price boundaries above and below the current market price
in order to minimize losses and acquire some gains.57 As you can see in the below
diagram Figure 10, stock XYZ has an intrinsic value of $25, with all information made
available. At time 0, the price is at $25, but for some reason some shares are sold by
smaller investors. Even though there are only a few small investors choosing to sell, but
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several sell orders cause the price to drop slightly, which creates more sell orders from
other small investors afraid that their potential profits are decreasing. This creates a
panic, as the price of stock will drop even further.
At time A, the price of the stock has reached the lower boundary set up by the
investors, so the remaining small investors sell their shares, dropping the price even
further. Now that the price of the stock is under $23, “sharks” or professional investors
purchase these shares because they are undervalued, and can become profitable if sold
later. At price B, the stock has started to level off, and the major selling is over. Here,
small investors start buying the stock, creating more demand forcing the stock price up
to C. Small investors notice the upswing in price, and decide to follow the herd and move
in on this stock as well moving the price above the upper boundary of the early investors.
As this occurs, those small investors, and some professionals see this price above their
upper value, and above the intrinsic value and sell their shares to earn a profit, causing
more sales of the stock, starting the roller-coaster process all over again.
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Figure 10: Herding: Sharks vs Lemmings in the Stock Market.

Source: Dallas Brozik, "Sharks and Lemmings: How the Stock Market REALLY Works,”
Marshall University.

Bubbles
Herd mentality has played a role in creating stock market bubbles throughout
history, whether it’s the Tulipmania of the 1600s, or the market bubble and crash in 1987,
the dot-com bubble, and the financial crisis in 2008. A speculative bubble occurs when
stock prices deviate considerably from their intrinsic value over a period of time until it
reaches a bursting point.58 Bubbles can occur rationally, but the negative effects from a
bubble are typically caused by irrational behavior. Prices cannot rise forever, and
therefore bubbles are not sustainable forever. As demand continues to rise, prices rise

John A. Sondey, “Random Walks, Lemmings, and Behaviorism: The Search for a Market Lodestar,”
(Economic Staff papers, South Dakota State University, 2001), 10.
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with it, but at some point, the demand no longer rises, in fact it reverses course generating
a downward feedback pattern.59

Tulipmania
One of the earliest known bubbles did not involve the stock market, or housing, but
involved Tulips. In the mid-1600s Tulips were imported from what is now Turkey, to
Holland. Tulips were considered very rare, and prestigious. By the turn of the century
the Dutch became the main suppliers of Tulip bulbs, and at the same time fashion had
spread throughout Europe.60 By 1620 tulips demand was starting to grow, but limited to
collectors and horticulturists, but shortly after the general public started to buy them as
well. As the demand swelled, so did the prices. At one point houses in Holland sold for
the price of three tulip bulbs.61 In fact, according to Dreman, tulip bulbs were selling at
more than their weight in gold. The demand was so high, that sellers sold bulbs they did
not own to buyers who pledged money they did yet own (derivatives).62
The tulip market finally crashed in 1637, when bulbs could not be sold. Along with
the large issues of credit and less demand for the high price, sellers panicked looking for
sellers, but there were none. Because prices dropped so significantly, those buyers who
promised to pay at higher prices reneged on their commitments, causing huge issues of
credit. There was no intrinsic value to the tulip bulb that should have skyrocketed its price
to nearly $10,000 a bulb. While demand was high, it was in hopes to resell it immediately
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to someone less rational they themselves, or greater fool theory. Greater fool theory
implies “any price, no matter how out of line with historical values, can be justified if you
believe that there is another buyer who will take the stock… off your hands for an even
greater price” (64). As Dreman puts it; “the human animal is apparently heavily influenced
by the whims of the moment, rather than the wisdom of the past.63

The Market Crash of October 1987
The stock market crash of 1987 is still widely debated among economists. On
Monday, October 19, 1987 the stock market prices would tumble sending out panic
across the globe. The markets of Hong Kong were first effected and then those in Europe,
and would fall over 20% that day in New York City.64 The previous Friday the markets
closed down roughly 5%. The plummet of the stock market on the 19th started due to
nothing more than the fact that news that the markets were down already. There was no
big national or global news story that day. No wars, no embargos, no new laws, no political
assassinations, nothing out of the ordinary. Thaler notes that the day after the attack on
Pearl Harbor the U.S. markets only dropped by 4.4% for the day.65
On Tuesday, the markets would jump by 5.3%, and 9.1% on Wednesday, and yet
fall again drastically by 8.3% on the following Monday. If the markets were truly efficient
and the players were rational, the markets would only change with respect to news, and
there was no news that week other than the fact the markets prices were volatile. Thaler
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argues that EMH cannot hold true do to the fact the market dropped 25% from Tuesday,
October 15th and the close on Monday, October 19th given the absence of news.66

Dot-Com Bubble
The herd also drove the dot.com bubble of the late 1990s, though it can be
considered rational. During this time, the internet was taking off, and new internet
companies were entering the stock market almost every day it seemed. While some of
this was driven by irrational investors purchasing stocks in companies they knew little
about (like Pets.com), much of this bubble was caused by rational herding of brokerage
accounts and fund managers. As discussed under groupthink, fund managers were not
only being compared to the overall return in the stock markets but also to their peers. As
many funds were heavily invested in internet stocks, in order to keep pace with their peers
they would need to invest in them as well, as there weren’t’ many other opportunities that
provided the same type of outrageous returns. Brian E. Stack, a fund manager of MFS
New Discover Fund told Business week in February of 1999; “if they want to beat their
benchmarks this year…we’ll either have to own investment stocks or be very proficient in
picking other stocks”.67 A study done by MIT found that young fund managers who
deviated from their peers were more likely to lose their jobs, than if they followed suit.68.
During this time, many fund managers believed they were in an internet bubble,
but they had to ride the bubble, not fight it.69 Even chief investment officer at Soros Fund
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Management Stanley Druckenmiller believed this were the case. In the eyes of Keynes
“beauty contest” they were busy predicting what their peers would do next, instead of
researching the stocks they were investing in. The goal was to ride the bubble as long as
they could, and get out before it burst. Many hedge funds did start to adjust their portfolio
before the collapse of the bubble from internet stocks to technology stocks, such as
Amazon.com and EBay. It was at this point though, that irrational individual investors
started to enter the markets.

Feedback Theory
Shiller calls this process the feedback theory, where the “feedback that propelled
the bubble carries the seeds of its own destruction, and so the end of the bubble may be
unrelated to news stories about fundamentals”70. In his book, Memoires of Extraordinary
Popular Delusions, Charles Mackay described the feedback theory in regards to the
tulipmania previously discussed:
Many individuals grew suddenly rich. A golden bait hung temptingly
out before the people, and one after another, they rushed to the
tulip marts, like Flies around a honey-pot.... At last, however, the
more prudent began to see that this folly could not last forever. Rich
people no longer bought the flowers to keep them in their gardens,
but to sell them again at cent per cent profit. It was seen that
somebody must lose fearfully in the end. As this conviction spread,
prices fell, and never rose again.71

Robert J. Shiller, “Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives
17, no. 1 (2003), 91-92
71 Ibid., 92.
70
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Cognitive Biases and Heuristics
One other way behavioral economics is contributing to the field of economics is
through the study of cognitive biases. Cognitive biases occur when a person thinks and
acts in a certain way that would take them away from them acting rationally. The most
common way this occurs is through the use of heuristics, or “rules of thumb”. These
heuristics simplify decision making by using mental shortcuts in order to answer difficult
questions more quickly. The use of heuristics often make people act irrationally, and
ignore base rate information associated with similar past occurrences. This counters the
statistical theory known as Bayes’ theorem which uses all known information when
assessing the probability of an event happening.

Bayes’ Theorem
Little is known about Thomas Bayes, an Englishman born in the early 18th century,
but his name is linked to one of statistics most famous theorems. Bayes’ theorem deals
with conditional probability, or the probability that a hypothesis is true given some recent
event occurred. Bayes’ theorem looks at the probability of an occurrence happening
based on the base rates, or prior known probabilities of an event occurring, plus the
probability of new found information. As new information or evidence is acquired, one
must update the probability of an event. Bayes’ theorem is made up of three parts: the
base rate, the true positive, and the posterior probability.
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Bayes' theorem is stated mathematically as the following equation:

Where A and B are events and P(B) ≠ 0.
P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of observing A and B without regard to each other.
P(A | B), a conditional probability, is the probability of observing event A given that B is
true.
P(B | A) is the probability of observing event B given that A is true.

We can view this theorem in simplistic forms. Let’s use an example of tossing two
coins, one fair (1 head and 1 tail) and one unfair or double-sided coin (two heads). If you
were to grab one of the coins, flip it and it lands on heads, what is the probability you
flipped the fair coin? In order to answer this, you need to look at the probability of the
events occurring. The first event has two possible outcomes, picking the fair coin (F) or
the unfair coin (U). In the next event, we flip the coin. If we flipped the fair coin we know
that we have equally likely chances of flipping a head or a tail. While if we had flipped the
unfair coin, the results still have two outcomes, however, in this case the results would
both be heads. This can be seen in the decision tree below in Figure 11. If the second
event lands on heads (H) we know that Tails did not occur, we do not include the tails
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outcome into our probability since it landed on heads. Since we know heads did occur,
we know the probability that he picked the fair outcome can be seen as:

𝑃 ( 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟 |𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠 ) =

1
3

1 heads result could from the fair coin, divided by three possible outcomes resulting in
heads. If this test was performed again, we have a result of 1/5 probability that he flipped
the fair coin. As we continue to flip the coins our confidence will approach 100% that it’s
the unfair coin being flipped, but we will never reach 100% certainty.

Figure 11: Conditional probability with Bayes' Theorem.

F

H

U

T

H
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In fact, one property of Bayes’ theorem is that our beliefs should all coverage
towards the truth.72 Nate silver provides an example in where he asks three investors
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Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise (New York: Penguin Books, 2015),259.
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whether they feel we are in a bull or bear market. One believed there was a 90% chance
we were in a bull market, one believed it was a 50% chance, while the other believed
there was only a 10% chance we were in a bull market. He set up a simulation where the
market increased day over day 60% of the time.73 As depicted in figure 12, while there
were ups- and downs in the market, the three investors views on whether they were in a
bull market converged to near 100% near the end of the experiments.

Figure 12: Bayesian Convergence in Market Predictions.

Source: Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise” Marshall University. New York: Penguin Books,
2015, 259.

Bayes’ theorem can be useful tool if used correctly and all the time. What we will
find later in this section is that people alter their probability estimates too drastically when
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they are given new information, or sometimes neglect new information all-together. We
will see this when we discuss the representative heuristic, where individuals give too
much weight to the evidence and thus too little weight to their prior beliefs”.74 People also
tend to take new information and overreact to it as well as become overconfident in their
predictions as they are swayed to heavily on the newest information.

Anchoring

EMH states that people should always act rationally when making economic
decisions, but we have already seen that is not always the case. Anchoring is one
example where people act irrational, even if it’s against their best interest to do so.
Anchoring involves attaching thoughts to a reference point or some piece of information
more that we should when making a decision. Once a person “anchors” to a particular
reference point they adjust their decisions insufficiently to reach some conclusion.75
In one classic study of anchoring, Tversky and Kahneman asked a group of
participants to estimate the percentage of African countries that are members of the
United Nations. Before the question was asked, Tversky and Kahman would spin a
roulette wheel with numbers ranging from 1-100 on it. When the wheel stopped, they
would ask the participants if they percentage was higher or lower than the number the
wheel landed on. They found this has a huge effect on the answer given, even though

De Bondt, Werner F.M. and Richard Thaler, “Financial Decision-Making in Markets and Firms: A
Behavioral Perspective.”Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, 1995, no. 9, 390.
75 Kishore, “Theory of Behavioral Finance”, 6.
74
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the number on the wheel gave no valid information to answer the question. They found
that if the wheel stopped on the number ten, the average percentage given was 25. If the
wheel stopped on the number sixty-five, the average percentage given was 45.
We can see anchoring occur within financial markets as well. Vanguard investment
professionals have found that when funds on the FTSE 100 Index have round numbers,
say 5,000 points for example, there is disproportionate interest in those funds, despite
their recent moves.76 Robert J. Shiller has found that investors tend to anchor level of
stock prices to the most recently remembered stock price.77 Prices also tend to be
anchored to prominent index funds, like the DOW and NASDAQ when they indexes are
nearing round number levels. You can see that as the DOW approaches a whole
thousand, it may actually take a few days before breaking that barrier, as it’s a
psychological indicator.
Shiller also notes that changes in individual stock prices tend to be anchored to
the price changes in similar stocks. He explains: “this kind of anchoring may help to
explain why individual stock prices move together as much as they do, and thus,
ultimately why stock prices indices are as volatile as they are … why the averaging across
stocks that is inherent in the constructions of the index doesn’t more solidly dampen its
volatility”.78

Alistair Byrne, “Understanding How the Mind Can Help or Hinder Investment Success,” Behavioural
Finance,Vanguard, https://www.vanguard.co.uk/documents/portal/literature/behavourial-financeguide.pdf. , 18.
77 Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 167.
78 Ibid.
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Overconfidence

The state of long-term expectation, upon which our decisions are
based does not solely depend on the most probably forecast we
can make. It also depends on the confidence with which we make
this forecast – or how highly we rate the likelihood of our best
forecast turning out quite wrong. – John Maynard Keynes, 1936

One area closely associated with Anchoring is the overconfidence bias, in which
one has excessive confidence in one’s own abilities. This is similar to the confirmation
bias where one tends to focus and remember information that reinstates their own beliefs
and preconceptions. A Texas study showed that 90% of drives questioned believed they
have above average driving skills, and over 80% ranked themselves in the top one third
of the population.79
In a quick in person survey of random individuals I asked 35 peers to rank their
driving on scale of 1 to 9, 1 being a “bad driver”, 4 and 5 being an “average driver” and 9
being “excellent driver”. The average of the 35 individuals questioned was 7.51, or in the
top 84%. As the Figure 13 clearly shows below, that everyone but one participate rated
themselves above average, and 21 out of 35 responded that they were in the top 20% in
driver ability.

Kevin Bracker, “Introducing Behavioral Finance: A Student Quiz,” Journal of Financial Education 39, no
¾ (2013): 75.
79
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Figure 13: Overconfidence and Driving Skills.
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Source: Justin L. Nagy, February,2017

People tend to forget past failures, yet can easily recollect the positive outcomes
of the past. One major issue with overconfident investors is it leads them to believe they
can outperform the market. John A Sondey notes:
If the investor becomes increasingly confident in his ability to ferret
out important data, assimilate and evaluate it, generating “private
information” he will underestimate his own forecasting errors while
overvaluing his abilities as a stock-picker. Moreover, the informed,
overconfident investor will overreact to his self-generated private
information and underreact to public signals (stock split
announcement, dividend change, insider buying or selling) which
may counter or corroborate his personal perspective on a stock
51

Moreover, when public information supports investors private
signals, confidence levels rise significantly. However, when public
information contradicts private signals, confidence levels fall only
modestly as investors attribute (investment) failure to external
events – beyond their control.80

Overconfident investors also tend to conduct more trades then others as they
believe they are better at choosing the right stocks at the right time, thus causing these
investors to “under-react to new information” leading to lower yields than the market.81
Barber and Odean, two behavioral theorists, conducted a study of nearly 80,000
professional investors. They broke these investors into five groups, based on how
actively they traded individual stocks and they showed for those that traded most
frequently, they had an annual return of about 6% less, after transaction costs compared
to those who traded the least.82 The highest trader’s turnover their portfolios more than
twice a year, while the average investor turned over 75% of their portfolio.83 Barber and
Odean determined this can be explained by excessive trading due to overconfidence bias.
Several studies have also shown that when there has been a huge price change without
any substantial news or information, the anomalous price change reversed course the
following month.84
Robert J Shiller offers some final thoughts on overconfidence in regards to
speculative trading:

Sondey, “Random Walks”, 8.
Chaudhary, ”Impact of Behavioral Finance, 88.
82 Dargham, “The Implications of Behavioral Finance”, 17.
83 Benartzi, “Behavioral Finance in Action”, 12.
84 Kishore, “Theory of Behavioral Finance”, 7.
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Overconfidence, however generated, appears to be a fundamental
factor promoting the high value of trade we observe in speculative
markets. Without such overconfidence, one would think that there
would be little trading in financial markets. If people were
completely rations, then, roughly speaking, half the investors
should think that they are below average in their trading ability and
should therefore be unwilling to do speculative trades with the other
half, who they think will probably dominate them in trading. Thus,
the above -average half would have no one to trade with, and there
should ideally be no trading for speculative reasons.85

Availability Bias
Studies have shown that our decisions are strongly impacted by recent events and
observations. People tend to measure the probability and frequency of an event occurring
by the readily available instances of similar events in their recent memory.86 Events that
are traumatic, and evokes strong emotions will have a longer lasting effect than normal,
routine events. An example would be buying flood insurance after you’ve seen stories of
damaging flooding in nearby states. While the probably of a flood occurring in your area
hasn’t changed with this news, the traumatic video of seeing homes and cities destroyed
arouses emotions that can make people become irrational.
This can occur in the stock market too, especially with IPOs. One example is the
Pets.com IPO during the internet boom of the 1990s. While there are many other factors
that lead to the internet bubble busting, Pets.com can attribute much of their stock price
success due to their advertising. Pets.com spent millions on Super Bowl commercials
and their ad campaigns were unforgettable, with their mascot sock puppet stating “pets

Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 172.
Max H. Bazerman and Don Moore, Judgement in Managerial Decision Making 7th ed. (New York: Wiley,
2009), 7.
85
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can’t drive”. With very little sales, and high shipping costs, the company raised $82 million
dollars during the initial offering. The stock went from a high of $14 at launch in February
2000, down to $0.19 a share by November of that year. People bought shares of
Pets.com because of the familiarity of the commercials, and because of the hype
surrounding the launch of the IPO. Peter Lynch, a former fund manager for Fidelity
Investments believes in “buying stock in firms that are unavailable in the minds of most
investors (blandness); the more available the stock is… the more overvalued it will be”.87

Framing

The framing heuristic deals with the way an individual perceives a problem. In
traditional finance people use frame independence when making decisions, that is, only
the information presented matters, not the order or way it is presented.88 Kahneman and
Tversky found that people make decisions based on frame dependence, meaning how
the question is asked, not just the information presented before them. A classic example
is when stating the chance of death. If the World Health Organization said that out of 100
people, 90 will survive or 10 out of 100 people will die, people will focus on the later,
because people tend to focus on death.
Framing can play an irrational role investment management as well. People make
subconscious framing decisions because of the way stocks are presented to them. Andrei
Shleifer notes; “investors allocate more of their weight to stocks rather than bonds when
they see a very impressive history of long-term stock returns relative to those on bonds,
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than if they see the volatile short-term stock returns”.89 Alistair Byrne also found that
investors focus on the results of individual securities and funds in their portfolio instead
at an aggregate level. Because of this “narrow” frame, investors worry over poor
performances of a single stock, while those who look at their whole portfolio are not as
concerned about small changes of individual stocks in the short -term. Finance theory
argues that we focus on our total wealth when it comes do financial decision making.
Behavioral economists would argue that investors should look at loses or wins as small
movements, not one large shift. Instead of seeing a stock valued at $90 today, when 6
months ago it was valued at $100, look at a smaller time frame to see how the movements
are trending. By narrowing your framework, you can eliminate the framing bias.

Representativeness
One final heuristic is representativeness bias which occurs when individuals see
something for “what it looks like” rather than evaluating the scenario. Andrei Shleifer
explains representativeness as “the tendency of experimental subjects to view events as
typical or representative of some specific class and to ignore the laws of probability in the
process “.90 In one widely cited study, Kahnmean and Tversy asked a group to pick a
subject’s fields (student) based on some characteristics of the subject. In the 1970s they
posed the following question:
Tom W. is of high intelligence, although lacking in true creativity. He has a
need for order and clarity, and for neat and tidy systems in which every
detail finds its appropriate place. His writing is rather dull and mechanical,
occasionally enlivened by somewhat corny puns and by flashes of
imagination of the sci-fi type. He has a strong drive for competence. He
89
90
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seems to feel little sympathy for other people and does not enjoy
interacting with others. Self-centered, he nonetheless has a deep moral
sense.
The rankings from the study are shown below. The top field of study predicted was
computer science, likely due to the “nerdiness” attributes, followed by engineering due to
the mechanical and dull characters.91

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

computer science
engineering
business administration
physical and life sciences
library science
law
medicine
humanities and education
social science and social work

The results show that people forget to look at the probability of events occurring when
making predictions. If this test was done today, it might be more likely for Tom to be in
the field of computer science, but still not as likely due to the probability of these jobs
being available. By ignoring probability, you are ignoring the base rates of the various
fields. If you were not given any information on Tom, just that he was a student, based
on likelihood of fields of study alone humanities and education and social science and
social work would be near the top as there are a larger portion of students as a whole in
those fields.
Quite possibly Tversky’s and Kahenemans most famous study had to deal with a
fictional subject named Linda. They wanted to test representativeness with relation to the
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probability of conjunction. The probably of conjunction notes that the probability of A and
B cannot be greater than the individual probability of A and B.
𝑃(𝐴 + 𝐵) > 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵)
Tverksky and Kahneman found that subjects tend to find the conjunctive to be more likely
“if it is more representative of how they characterize an event or individual”.92 The pitfall
arrives when “a detailed description of an individual’s personality matches up well with
the subject’s experiences with people of a particular profession, the subject (then) tends
to significantly overestimate the actual probability that the given individual belongs to that
profession.93 In the case study of “Linda” they asked the below question:
Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with
issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in
antinuclear demonstrations. Thinking of Linda, what alternative is more
probable?
Which alternative is more probable?
A) Linda is a bank teller
B) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement
They found between 85-90% of undergraduates at several major universities chose
option B, contrary to the probability logic mentioned above.
To test this experiment, I asked 86 participates the same question, and received
nearly identical results. As shown in Figure 14, of the 86 participants, 68 responded with
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choice B, or 79.07%, well within the standard deviation of Tversky and Kahneman’s
results.
Figure 14: Representativeness: The “Linda” Experiment.

Source: Justin L. Nagy, February, 2017

Robert Shiller describes representativeness as “judgements in uncertain situations
by looking for familiar patterns and assuming that future patterns will resemble past ones,
often without sufficient consideration of the reasons for the pattern or the probability of
the pattern repeating itself” 94 Everyday investors make this mistake when assuming that
shares in a well-known company automatically leads to a good investment. In this case,
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other factors need to be looked at. Many long-lasting firms do not have consistent returns,
and are not investing much in R&D, and are more focused on maintaining revenue. If this
company does not offer a dividend, you may not see much in the growth in the stock price
as this company is focused on longevity, not development. Investors forget that the share
price may already reflect the overall quality of the company and thus may only produce
modest returns. Investors often conclude that past history represents future projections,
as a company who has several years of consistent growth will continue that way in the
future.
One final note on representative heuristic is that it tends to tempt individuals to
give too much credit to recent evidence, and small sample and too little weight to larger
picture and prior odds. It is important to look at the whole picture when evaluating stocks.
If we were to look at Figure 15 below you would see a consistent up trek in value. If an
investor were too look at this alone, they would assume this stock is headed in the right
direction, and could signal a good buy.
Figure 15: Representativeness and Daily Market Value over Small Sample Size.
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However, if we pan-out and look at a longer period of time, in this case 100 days, we can
see that during this time the we can see over the average value is roughly 1100, and in
fact dips back down to the starting price by day 100.
Figure 16: Daily Market Value over 100 Days.
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Chapter Six: Empirical Evidence
Overreaction in the Stock Market: Representativeness and Bayes’
Theorem
New Zealand Stock Exchange Study
One study by Simon Swallow and Mark Fox of Lincoln University tested whether
or not investors overreact to new information in the stock market. This would of course
go against Bayes’ theorem of weighing all information equally. They proposed: “if shares
exhibit an initial significant return (positive or negative) that is followed by a subsequent
return reversal, then this would confirm the ‘overreaction’ hypothesis”. 95 If the prices
reversed course back to their true economic price, an overreaction occurred, while if there
was no significant reversal, investors where using a “Bayesian” approach when making
decisions regarding stock purchases.
Swallow and Fox looked at all New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE) companies
over a one year period from April 1994 through March 1995. They selected the top three
and bottom three performers on 50 random days to help ensure validity in their
experiment. The six companies over these 50 random days were analyzed for the
subsequent 10 days to see if there were any price reversals. There was a total of 11 days
observed where t=0, was the day of the first major price change, or day of any “news”,
t=1 is the first day after the first price movement and t=10 is the tenth day or last day of
observation. Their results can be found in the Appendix, but are also graphed in Figure
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17 below. You can see that at t=1 there is a major correction on days with good news
and bad news. Swallow and Fox concluded that in the short-run it appears investors
overreact and invest with a representative heuristic and ignore the Bayesian ideology.

Figure 17: The Cumulative Average Returns for Winner and Loser Shares on the
NZSE.

Source: Simon Swallow and Mark Fox, "Investor Psychology in New Zealand,” Lincoln
University.

They found that of the “losers”, the 3 corrective days after the initial price movement
totaled around 35 percent of the total movement on t=0. When looking at the winners, the
first day saw an average correction of nearly 25 percent, from 12.57% return, to a -3.09%
return on t=1. They concluded that investors overreact to both good and bad news,
behave less rationally and overreact more to negative news. They found that there is also
a longer correction period after bad news confirming the representative heuristic.
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De Bondt and Thaler Study
Werner De Bondt and Richard Thaler also tested if investors overreact and violate
Bayes’ Law. In their study discussed in their paper, “Does the Stock Market Overreact,”
they examined returns in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) over a 36- month period.
After examining the results, they separated the top 35 performing stocks into the “winner’s
portfolio” and the 35 worst performing stocks into the “loser’s portfolio”. The results
showed that the winner’s portfolio consistently underperformed compared to the market
index. On the other hand, the loser’s portfolio beat the market index by a wide margin.
Figure 18 shows the results for each portfolio over the 3-year period of observation.
They found that over the last half-century (1930-1980) the 35 stocks in the loser portfolio
outperformed the market by an average of 19.6%, 36 months after the formation of the
portfolio.96 During the same time period the winner’s portfolio actually did around 5%
worse compared to the market index.

De Bondt, Werner F.M. and Richard Thaler, “Does the Stock Market Overreact,” The Journal of Finance,
XL, no. 3, 799.
96 96
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Figure 18: Average of 16 3-year test periods.

Source: De Bondt, Werner F.M. and Richard Thaler, "Does the Stock Markety Overreact?” The
Journal of Finance, XL, no. 3, 800.

They had three man conclusions from their study:
1. There is asymmetry when it comes to overreaction to news in the stock
market. The adjustment is much greater for the losers than it is for the
winners long-term.
2. There seems to be a seasonal effect to the large adjustment in gains,
specifically in January. This is often referred to as the January Effect. The
main theory behind this is in December, as the year ends investors will sell
“losing” stocks as those will provide tax-benefits due to the loses. Then, in
64

January when the stocks are thought to be undervalued, they are
repurchased back to their portfolio.
3. Lastly, they found that the overreaction mostly occurred in the second and
third year following the start of the test period.97 The differences between
the winning portfolio and losing portfolio is roughly 5.4% after year one. By
the end of year two, it’s roughly 20%.

Lastly, they found further evidence to the January Effect when looking at returns
over five-month periods. They formed winners and loser’s portfolios based on the
residual returns over the previous five years. The residual return is equal to the excess
return, minus the benchmark excess return times its beta. Figure 19 represents what an
investor could expect if they were aware of the “overreaction phenomenon”. 98 Even after
five years, the January Effect is still observable. Between October and December of each
given year, there is a sharp decline in value in relations to the market. This reinforces
the tax-loss savings benefit previously mentioned. When comparing the winner’s
portfolio to the losers we see the opposite occur, but to a lesser degree. During the last
couple months of a year the average returns increase, but take a dip in January of the
next year.99

Ibid., 799.
Ibid., 802.
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Figure 19: Average of 46 Yearly Replications Starting Every January from 1933 to
1978.

Source: De Bondt, Werner F.M. and Richard Thaler, "Does the Stock Markety Overreact?” The
Journal of Finance, XL, no. 3, 803.

Herding in the Swedish Markets
Per Ohlson from Jonkoping University studied herd behavior in the Swedish
Market from 1998 through 2009 and found that herding does exist, especially in the bullish
markets of 2005 and 2007. He used several methods to test this, one of which was the
Dummy Method developed by William G. Christie and Roger D. Huang. This method is
“market focused, which means that it measures investors’’ tendency to follow the mean
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of the entire market”.100 When this occurs investors ignore their own opinions and
knowledge, and instead favor the market, which “causes returns to cluster closer around
the market returns”.101 Christie and Hauge found that during stable market conditions
investors tend to act rational, but act irrational during large stock movements.
To measure how individual stock returns, compare to the market returns we use
a cross sectional standard deviation (CCSD) or dispersion approach. This will test how
the return of an individual stock compares to the mean of that portfolio. If there is
complete herd behavior we would see a dispersion of zero.102

Where R is the observed stock return of firm I, at time t and N is the number of
stocks in the portfolio. To determine if there was herding in the market, Christie and Huang
added a dummy variable. In order to capture differences in herding during severe upmarkets and down markets dummy variables are used. The CSSD returns are then
regressed against two dummy variables along with the constant.103 In the below formula
𝐷𝐿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑈 represent dummy variables during extreme phases of market returns. The
formula is:

Ohlson, Per, “Herd Behavior on the Swedish Stock Exchange,”, Jonkoping International Business School,
May 2010, 15.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
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If CSSD values are lower during these phases CSSD and Rm,t
move in opposite direction indicated by a negative value of the
coefficient. For example, if b1 or b2 has a negative relation to the
CSSD estimate, herd behavior is implied to be present. In that case,
it means that in the most extreme market days the CSSD measure
actually decreases.104

Figure 20: Construction of the dummy variables.

Source: Ohlson, Per, "Herd Behavior on the Swedish Stock Exchange” Jonkoping International
Business School, 2010, p17.

Ohlson also used a linearity method. The reason for this is due to the fact it doesn’t
only assume herding in the most volatile periods, and can detect herding in small
movements.105

104
105

Ibid., 16.
Ibid.

68

where Rm,t stand for market return. A significantly negative γ2 coefficient implies
evidence of herd behavior.

Results
The results of using Chrisite’s and Huants Dummy Method indicated no herding in
the markets, since B1 and B2 were both positive. Their results concluded as follows:
…t-values are significant. The 1% respectively the 5% criterion
refers to test with 1% or 5% of the Rm,t distribution marked as
extreme market phases, thus with “1” as a dummy variable. The α
parameter represents the rest of the population, the normal phases
of the stock market, hence marked with the dummy variable “0” in
the test. The adjusted R square value is used to ex-plain the
models’ goodness of fit. That is, the percentage of variance in the
dependent variable that is explained collectively by the independent
variables. It is useful as a quality indicator, especially in comparison
to the other models since two of the models use the same
dependent variables. Not surprisingly the higher value of adjusted
R square is found with the 5% criterion model since it contains
additional dummy variables marked with “1”. That is, the 5%
criterion model explains the dependent variables variance to a
higher degree than test with the 1% criterion.106
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Figure 21: The Dummy Models covering 1998 to 2009.

Source: Ohlson, Per, "Herd Behavior on the Swedish Stock Exchange” Jonkiping International
Business School, 2010, p23.

The results using the more scientific Linearity Model did show signs of herding in
the market overall in Figure 22. The Y2- coefficient is negative in this case and t-value is
significant. The results also show strong evidence of herding in bull market days by the
Y2 coefficient, and some evidence of herding in bear markets but not as strong. Since the
dummy variable method only allows herding to be present on days with the extreme
market movements, the linearity method should be preferred for testing.107

107

Ibid., 22.
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Figure 22: The Linearity Model Covering 1998 to 2009.

Source: Ohlson, Per, "Herd Behavior on the Swedish Stock Exchange” Jonkiping International
Business School, 2010, p24.

Finally, Ohlson also performed a linearity model to test evidence of herding
between large and small cap stocks. In Figure 23 we see a negative Y2 coefficient which
according to the hypothesis shows signs of herding. Next, we look at the adjusted R
square value to determine the fit of the results. The low adjusted R square value on the
large cap stocks does not present enough evidence to confirm the results of herding,
however the higher R square value on the small cap test suggests goodness of fit. Ohlsen
also concluded that there is a difference when comparing large and small cap stocks, and
that is the presence of institutional investors, and they are more prone to herd in extreme
market conditions.
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Figure 23: The Linearity Model Covering Large & Small Cap Stocks During 1998 to
2009.

Source: Ohlson, Per, "Herd Behavior on the Swedish Stock Exchange” Jonkiping International
Business School, 2010, p28.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions
Concluding remarks:
The idea that psychological factors cause people to be irrational in decision making
dates back Adam Smith. In his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he argued that
passions, such as sex, and emotions such as Fear and anger, drove people’s desires
and decisions.108 He wrote about loss-aversion in regards to pain being a more powerful
sensation than joy, when he stated: “the pleasure which we are to enjoy ten years hence,
interests us so little in comparison with that which we may enjoy today”.109 Smith also
wrote in depth about overconfidence, fairness, self-control and altruism, all psychological
factors that cannot be measured through fundamental economics.
Nearly two-hundred years later Keynes compared the stock market to a beauty
contest where one is not trying to decide the most beautiful contestant, but is trying to
decide what the other contestants feel is the most beautiful contestant. In buying and
selling stocks investors are trying to sell stocks not by what we know, but by what other
investors know and feel. Keynes also argued that it was impossible to estimate the value
a railroad business 10 years from not, let alone an equity’s value.
By the mid-1970s the EMH was the widely-accepted theory on the stock markets,
but by the 1980s, a small group of economists were looking to not only challenge the
EMH, but to understand how our own mental limitations effect markets. Psychologists

Nava Ashraf, Coling F. Camerer and George Lowenstein, “Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 3 (2005): 131.
109 Ibid., 133.
108
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Tversky and Kahneman did ample research in their fields that showed the limitations in
decision making. Their contribution to the Prospect Theory showed that individuals violate
the theory of utility maximization due to the lack of a reference point. Investors make
decisions based on gains and losses, rather than the end level of wealth. They found that
investors tend to sell winners too soon, and hold on to losers too long. The fear of regret,
and pain associated with loses outweighs the joy of the gains. People do not want to
admit they made a mistake in purchasing a poor stock.
Tversky and Kahneman also studied cognitive biases and heuristics. They found
that people “anchor” their view to a particular reference point, and adjust their decisions
around this point. For example, if Apple’s stock price was $125 last month, but has been
trending at $110 the last week, investors will anchor to the $125 price as the price Apple
Inc. was, and “should be”. They will use this as a guide price if they should sell, or buy
more shares.
Investors also tend to be overconfident in their own abilities. As my survey showed
earlier, 60% off all those surveyed believed they were in the top 20% when it came to
their driving abilities. Overconfidence also influences investors to trade more often, as
they believe they are better at choosing the right stocks at the right time, as well as it
causes investors to under-react to new information.
Investors also tend to take part in groupthink and herd mentality. We have seen
that investors follow the herd for multiple reasons. Average investors may follow because
they believe a large group of people cannot be wrong, and a group individuals should be
smarter than one. In the famous Asch experiment participants answered incorrectly which
lines were equal, even though they knew the answer they were given was incorrect. We
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found professional investors herd due to social pressures, and fear of losing their jobs. It
is better to be wrong along with everyone else, than to be wrong by yourself. Herd
behavior has led to several bubbles and crashes, including the tulipmania in the
Netherlands, the stock market crash in 1987, the dot.com bubble of the late 1990s and
the most recent financial crisis. All of these created due to fads, following the herds, and
irrational exuberance.
Finally, we looked at the representativeness heuristic, and found that individuals
evaluate something for what it looks like, rather than evaluating the entire scenario. We
tend to ignore the laws of probability, and instead focus on one or two specific scenarios
or examples when making decisions. This was seen in the famous “Linda” experiment,
where participants were looking at what they think her personality represented, instead
of looking at the laws of probability, that the probability of A and B happening cannot be
greater than the individual probability of A and B. Representativeness heuristic tends to
tempt individuals to credit recent history, more than the larger picture. If you only look at
a 10-day window of a stock price movement, or only look at the one piece of fundamental
information on a firm’s balance sheet, you may be missing some other key factors in
deciphering the true value of the stock.
Behavioral finance has significantly contributed to better understanding the stock
market in terms of price movements, and investor’s behavior over the last 30 years. With
the advancement of behavioral finance, we may be able to predict investor’s behavior in
the future and improve market efficiency. Through challenging economic theories of utility
maximization and the EMH, further discussions and studies will take place allowing us to
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further explore decision making in equity markets. Continued advancement will help
investors to understand their own limitations, and become more rational in the long-term.
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Appendix
Data Results: Online Survey.

In addition to whatever you own, you have been given a gift of $1,000, free of charge. You are now asked
to choose between the following:
Response
Percent

Response Count

A sure gain of $500

76.7%

66

A 50% chance to gain $1,000 and a 50% chance to gain nothing.

23.3%

20

Answer Options

answered question

86

Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student,
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in
antinuclear demonstrations. Thinking of Linda, what alternative is more probable?
Response
Percent

Response Count

Linda is a bank teller.

20.9%

18

Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.

79.1%

68

Answer Options

answered question

86

You purchased 100 shares of a well-known company stock a month ago at $80 a share. The stock
recently peaked at $95 a share, but today has plummeted to $75a share. You look at the Yahoo Finance
and see there is high volume of people selling their shares. You haven't heard any news today regarding
the stock, and don't know why it's falling. What do you do?
Answer Options
Hold on to the shares, because they might go back up above your
purchase price.
Buy more shares because the price might go back up.
Sell your shares at today's $75 value and and lose $5 per share
from your purchase price as you don't know if the price will
continue to fall.

Response
Percent

Response Count

87.2%

75

9.3%

8

3.5%

3

answered question
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86

You are offered a gamble on the toss of a coin. If the coin shows tails, you lose $100.If the coin shows
heads, you win $150 . Is this gamble attractive? Would you accept it?
Response
Percent

Response Count

Yes

10.5%

9

No

89.5%
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Answer Options

answered question

Data Results: In person Survey for Driving Abilities.
Male/Female
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
M
M
F
F
F
M
M
F
M
M
M
F
F
F
M
F
M

Driver ranking
9
8
6
5
5
8
6
7
6
9
7
6
8
8
9
9
9
6
8
9
8
9
7
8
9
8

Average
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
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M
F
F
F
M
M
F
F
F
Average

8
7
9
4
9
6
8
8
7
7.51

7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51
7.51

100 Day Daily Market Value Data.
Day
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Level
1000
1001
1003
1002
999
999
996
995
1000
1001
1005
1006
1010
1011
1018
1019
1025
1030
1033
1030
1029
1035
1038
1040
1041
1042
1045
1090
1148
1150

Day2
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Level3
1210
1250
1260
1270
1280
1290
1295
1300
1315
1320
1325
1330
1333
1338
1345
1350
1375
1380
1390
1300
1250
1200
1180
1175
1160
1190
1180
1179
1178
1175

79

Day3
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Level5
1162
1160
1161
1161
1160
1151
1149
1148
1050
1045
1042
1041
1040
1038
1035
1029
1030
1033
1030
1025
1019
1015
1011
1005
1003
1002
1001
1000
995
996

31
32
33
34
35

1160
1170
1180
1190
1200

66
67
68
69
70

1170
1169
1168
1165
1165

Data Results from Swallow and Fox Study:
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